The past forty years or so has seen a remarkable transformation in macro-models used by central banks, policymakers and forecasting bodies. This papers describes this transformation from reduced-form behavioural equations estimated separately, through to contemporary micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models estimated by systems methods. In particular by treating DSGE models estimated by Bayesian-Maximum-Likelihood methods I argue that they can be considered as probability models in the sense described by Sims (2007) and be used for risk-assessment and policy design. This is true for any one model, but with a range of models on offer it is possible also to design interest rate rules that are simple and robust across the rival models and across the distribution of parameter estimates for each of these rivals as in Levine et al. (2008) .
the model is micro-founded these changes must originate from the parameters and functional forms defining consumer tastes and technology. A tractable way of dealing with these is to assume exogenous stochastic shocks shift preferences and change productivity. A robust monetary policy will then set out to maximize some expected welfare criterion averaged over the distributions of these shocks.
But there is far more to robust policy then dealing with exogenous uncertainty. Policymakers must also incorporate robustness with respect to model uncertainty that takes into account the possibility that their modelling framework is wrong and within each framework they must allow for the fact that they estimate parameter distributions and not just their mode.
With parameter distribution we have in effect a distribution of models. In the words of Sims (2007) models now become probability models. Armed with a series of probability models across different modelling frameworks the policymaker can now incorporate risk assessment and robust rules into the conduct of policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of the evolution of macroeconomic modelling strategies over the past thirty or so years. Section 3 discusses different approaches to robustness before going onto our favoured Bayesian approach to section 4. Section 5 concludes with suggestions for future research.
Towards a Common Modelling Methodology
The past forty years or so has seen a remarkable transformation in macromodels used by central banks, policymakers and forecasting bodies. In the 1960s-70s econometric models were based on equation-by-equation estimation of reduced form behavioural equations without explicit expectations.
Large models were then constructed using these behavioural relationships as building blocks alongside identities defining aggregate demand, trade bal-ances and the government budget constraint. The introduction of first adaptive and then rational expectations led to what proved to be a fatal blow for this generation of models -the Lucas Critique (Lucas (1972) ). In the context of forward-looking agents with rational expectation this critique showed that apparently stable empirical backward-looking relationship between, for example, consumption, post-tax income and real consumption was not independent of the policy rule in place. The implication of this finding is that these models were at best suitable for forecasting on the basis of a continuation of existing policy and were unfit for the purpose of examining the consequences of different policies. Looking back from the vantage point of today, these apparently structural models were no better that VARs for forecasting and ranking policies.
Early models certainly lacked coherence in that different behavioural relationships involving the same optimizing agent such as the firm often led an independent existence. The seminal paper Kydland and Prescott (1982) produced the first small coherent dynamic general equilibrium macro model built from solid micro-foundations with expected utility optimizing forwardlooking agents. This first 'Real Business Cycle' (RBC) model was stochastic and therefore of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) form, with only one exogenous shock to technology. Despite this simple structure, the model was remarkably successful at reproducing the volatilities of some observed variables.
Although there were many dimensions along which the RBC model failed on its own terms (notably in reproducing observed output persistence and the volatility of hours), the move to the latest incarnation of New Keynesian (NK) DSGE models was driven, at least within academia, by the need to replicate the monetary transmission mechanism from monetary shocks to short-run fluctuations revealed by numerous VAR studies. Central banks of course seized upon this development of an intellectually sound model that the same time gave them a raison d'etre. The main features of the NK DSGE models are first a real RBC core with an outer shell consisting of nominal rigidities and other frictions. These are increasingly estimated by systems estimation using Bayesian-Maximum Likelihood Estimation. DYNARE developed by Michel Juillard and his collaborators has proved a very popular software package for carrying out the estimation procedure.
NK DSGE models are widely used especially by central banks and are generally seen to constitute an "impressive achievement" Blanchard (2008) .
But there are acknowledged shortcomings. The first is fundamental and common to RBC and NK models alike -problems with rationality and Expected Utility Maximization (EUM). The second is that DSGE models examine fluctuations about an exogenous balanced growth path and there is no role for endogenous growth. The third consists of a number of empirical concerns and finally there is another fundamental problem with any micro-founded macro-model -that of heterogeneity and aggregation. We consider these in turn.
The assumption of rationality in general and that of rational expectations in particular has naturally generated a lively debate in economics and the social sciences. The assumption of perfect rationality has come under scrutiny since the 1950s when Herbert A. Simon claimed that agents are not realistically so rational so as to aspire to pay-off maximization. Instead he proposed 'bounded rationality' as a more realistic alternative to the assumption of rationality, incorporating players' inductive reasoning processes. This is the route that the Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) models take (see, for example, LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008) ). Certainly, experimental studies of decision-making show human behaviour to be regularly inconsistent and contradictory to the assumption of perfect rationality. That said, experiments using people and ACE models suggest agents can learn to be rational so that rationality may well be a reasonable empirical postulate to describe behaviour near a long-run steady state. This view is supported by statistical learning in theoretical macro-models which converges to rational expectations equilibria (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) ) Models can only be beaten by alternative models. A model of irrationality has to pin down why one decision is preferred to another and here we observe that analytically tractable theories of the inconsistency and irrationality in human behaviour simply have not yet been developed. Hence our best analytical models are based on the rationality assumption as we unfortunately have nothing superior on offer. However we can be more positive than that at least when it comes to competitive behaviour. Darwinian selection helps rational (that is, profit-maximizing) firms (profit-maximizing) to succeed in competition.
Perhaps the most convincing argument for adopting the rationality argument is provided by Myerson (1999) . If we first appreciate that the aim of social sciences is not only to predict human behaviour in the abstract but also, crucially, to analyze social institutions and assess proposals for their reform. As such, it is useful to evaluate these institutions under the assumption of perfect rationality, which in turn intimates that the agents in the institution are always seeking to maximize their payoff. In this way, we can solve for flaws as either defects in the institutional structure (and thereby institutional reform is the required solution) or as flaws in the rationality of the agents (which begs for improved education and/or provision of information for individuals). Accordingly this has become a logical and useful assumption for economists in order to see with more clarity when social problems must be solved by institutional reform. This argument can be refined to illustrate why this individual perfection assumption should be one of intelligent rational maximization, as in the models of non-cooperative game theory. Thus an argument for reform of social institutions (rather than for re-education of individuals) is most persuasive when it is based on a model which assumes that individuals intelligently understand their environment and rationally act to maximize their own welfare.
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Even if we accept utility maximization, there still is an issue of whether it should be expected utility maximization (EUM). An alternative supported by experiments is Prospect Theory which takes into account that people behave 3 I am grateful to Mustapha Doukoure for this summary of the Myerson argument. as if extremely improbable events are impossible and extremely probable events are certain (see Shiller (1999) ). Prospect theory can explain phenomena such as the equity premium puzzle. However it is extremely difficult in incorporate into general equilibrium modelling; in the words of Shiller "EUM can be a workhorse for some sensible research".
Turning to our second limitation -the lack of a role for endogenous growth. As Lucas (1987) Not all these empirical concerns can be addressed by better econometrics.
Although asset prices make an appearance in the standard DSGE model they still do a terrible job at matching them with data. Our models cannot account for a range of financial observations ranging from the equity premium (Mehra and Prescott (1985) ) to the slope of the yield (Campbell (2003) ). As Smith (2008) points out these are first-order conflicts between data and theory about levels and not the second-order considerations about covariances considered up to now. One response is compromise theoretical rigor for statistical fit by combining DSGE and VAR (or rather global VAR or GVAR) structures as Pesaran and Smith (2006) . Another response is to improve the models by exploring different utility functions (or 'exotic preferences') as in Barro (2007) . All these modelling alternatives highlight the need for robustness in policy design. Here the literature is sharply divided between two schools: the first has been developed by Hansen and Sargent (2003) , Hansen and Sargent (2007) (henceforth HS) and assumes unstructured uncertainty using a minimax robustness criterion to design monetary rules. It has three key ingredients that distinguishes it from alternatives. First, it conducts 'local analysis' in the sense that it assumes that the true model is known only up to some local neighbourhood of models that surround the 'approximating' or 'core' model. Second, it uses a minimax criterion without priors in model space. Third, the type of uncertainty is both unstructured and additive being reflected in additive shock processes that are 'chosen' by malevolent nature to feed back on state variables and so has to maximize the loss function the policy-maker is trying to minimize.
There are a number of question marks against the HS approach to robustness. First it pursues optimal policy, not optimized simple rules. As Levine and Pearlman (2010) show if one designs simple operational rules that mimic 4 Trichet (2005) .
the fully optimal but complex rule then they take the form of highly unconventional Taylor Rules which must respond to Nature's malign interventions.
They would be very hard to sell to policymakers. Let Ξ, Θ and Υ represent, respectively, the states of nature, the parameter set and the actions that a policymaker may take. Whenever policy υ ∈ Υ (e.g., an inflation targeting rule) is implemented for state of nature ξ ∈ Ξ, a given model m i , i ∈ 1, M , taken from M discrete candidates and a given set of parameters θ i ∈ Θ i , a loss is incurred:
this over all possible states of nature yields an expected loss
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of ξ, f (θ i , ξ).
In particular, for a central valueθ i of θ i this expected loss is denoted by 
This provides a measure of robustness of the policy for a given model, given the distribution of parameters for that model. Calculation of (1) Thus the integral in (2) is approximated by a sum.
Now assume in addition that there is model uncertainty, with posterior odds given by prob(m i is the correct model|y) =λ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ M . The Bayesian policymaker seeks υ to be robust to this as well, so that the posterior risk in this case is given byΩ
which incorporates both inter-model uncertainty or Model Averaging (BMA)
of Brock et al (2003 Brock et al ( , 2007 ) and intra-model uncertainty. Note that the rival models approach (which we do not utilize in this paper, since we have a posterior distribution that we can use) arises as the special case
and is usually computed for the central valuesθ i of each model m i only:
Thus the generation of the MCMC draws permits us to capture uncertainty in a structured manner: for a given model the policymaker knows not only the central location of, say, wage indexation, but also its dispersion from the MCMC draws of the posterior density. A Bayesian policymaker would exploit this information, and will further acknowledge the many candidate models that may characterize the economy (the BMA standpoint).
The policymaker would typically also choose an optimal (simple) rule υ opt for each of the cases Ω i (θ i , υ), Ω i (υ) andΩ(υ), so that in the last case we end up with the Robust Bayesian Rule. The differences Ω i (υ) − Ω i (θ i , υ) and Ω(υ) − Ω(θ i , υ) compare the welfare loss outcome under robust policy with that when the true model turns out to be m i with parameter central values θ i . We take these as measures of the cost of robustness.
Equation (3) represents the statement of Bayesian uncertainty and is
formally standard, e.g., Leamer (1978) , Koop (2003) . The nature and seriousness of (3) lies in its implementation. We make some points on our own implementation. First, and most bluntly, we take the Bayesian statement seriously. By contrast, in much of the literature, uncertainty forms -data, exogenous elements, model, parameter -are considered separately.
Second, the policymaker's welfare criterion is assumed to be a quadratic approximation of the representative agent's utility function (using the "large 
Bayesian inference also allows a framework for comparing alternative and potentially mis-specified models based on their marginal likelihood. For a given model m i ∈ M and common dataset, the latter is obtained by integrating out vector θ,
where p i (θ|m i ) is the prior density for model m i , and L (y|m i ) is the data density for model m i given parameter vector θ. To compare models (say, m i and m j ) we calculate the posterior odds ratio which is the ratio of their posterior model probabilities (or Bayes Factor when the prior odds ratio,
, is set to unity):
Components (7) and (8) The purpose of the exercise is to design robust interest rate inflation targeting rules that respond to expected future price and current wage inflation about the steady state. They are of the form
where i t is the nominal interest rate set at the beginning of period t, π t is current price inflation over the interval [t − 1, t], E t π t+j denotes expectations at time t of inflation over the interval [t + j − 1, t + j] and ∆w t is the corresponding current wage inflation rate. The lagged term represents a smoothing effect and if ρ = 1 we have an integral rule in which the change in the interest rate responds to price and wage inflation. All variables are proportional deviations about their steady states. This form of interest rate rule is then designed to incorporate increasing degrees of robustness:
• Model-variant and parameter robustness by maximizing expected welfare with respect to parameters ρ, θ π and θ ∆w across the rival models and across estimated parameter distributions within each model Three results stand out in this study. First there is general support for the proposition that robustness in the face of model uncertainty calls for a more cautious policy; that is a lower responses to current or expected inflation captured by the parameter θ π or to current inflation reflected in θ ∆w and more gradualism (high ρ). This result in fact goes back to Brainard (1967) , but it should be pointed out that it contrasts with the robust policy rules that arise from the Hansen-Sargent minimax approach that see robust policy as being faster and more aggressive. (2003) as originating from the dispersion of labour demand across firms setting staggered wages and prices.
The robustness exercise is perhaps too limited in that one should consider alternative labour market models with associated alternative models of the costs of inflation. This I suggest is just one future area for research, taking us to the final section of the paper.
DSGE Models and Emerging Economies
...capital inflows are raising the tensions of the "impossible trin-
While there is a substantial body of literature devoted to understanding business cycle dynamics in developed economies, research focusing on emerging economies is relatively sparser. Data limitations have often been identified as a cause, but the real challenge is to provide sensible explanations for the markedly distinct observed fluctuations in these economies.
Indeed, some stylized facts may be pointed out: output growth tends to be subject to larger swings in developing countries, private consumption, relative to income, is substantially more volatile, terms of trade and output are strongly positively correlated, while real interest rates and net exports are countercyclical (see Agenor et al. (2000) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005) , for example). Emerging market economies are also vulnerable to sudden and sharp reversals of capital inflows, the "sudden stops" highlighted in Calvo (1998) . Understanding these differences and carefully modeling the transmission mechanism of internal and external shocks is crucial to the design of stabilization programs and the conduct of economic policies. financing is partly or totally in foreign currency, as in Gertler et al. (2003) and Gilchrist (2003) ). This intensifies the exposure of a SOE to internal and external shocks in a manner consistent with the stylized facts listed above. In addition, we allow for liability dollarization and liquidity-constrained households, which further amplify the effects of financial stress. We then focus on monetary policy analysis, calibrating the model using data for India and the US economy. The Indian economy is small in relation to the world economy and we therefore treat it as a small open economy.
Many emerging economies conduct their monetary and fiscal policy according to the 'three pillars macroeconomic policy framework': a combination of a freely floating exchange rate, an explicit target for inflation over the medium run, and a mechanism that ensures a stable government debt-GDP ratio around a specified long run, but may allow for counter-cyclical adjustments of the fiscal deficit over the business cycle. By contrast, the cur-rency monetary policy stance of the Indian Reserve Bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to prevent what it regards as excessive volatility of the exchange rate. On the fiscal side, Central Government has a rigid fiscal deficit target of 3% of GDP irrespective of whether the economy is in boom or recession (Shah (2008) ). Thus, our framework allow us to contrast these implied policy prescriptions for interest rate rules.
There is now a growing literature that compares alternative monetary 6 The 'Road Ahead' ?
All models are wrong, but some are useful. Box (1979) .
The paper has attempted an overview of the 'journey so far' for macroeco- eral to move toward more heterogeneous models rather than attempting to model the full distribution of agents it makes sense to first work on more disaggregated models by introducing formal and informal sector, credit-constrained non-Ricardian (poor) household alongside Ricardian (well-off) households, entrepreneurs and workers etc.
•
Models of Expectations Formation
Staying broadly within the rational expectations paradigm a number of refinements are on offer that assume that agents are not able to perfectly observe states that define the economy. The 'Rational Inattention' literature (Sims (2005) , Luo and Young (2009), Luo (2006)) fits into this agenda. The basic idea is that agents can process information subject to a constraint that places an upper bound on the information flow. Borrowing from information theory (which in turn borrows from statistical physics) the idea is formalized by an upper bound on the decrease in entropy that ensues as agents proceed from a prior to a posterior of a signal. Levine et al. (2007) propose a general framework for introducing information limitations at the point agents form expectations. A more drastic deviation from rational expectations is provided by the statistical rational learning literature already mentioned. This introduces a specific form of bounded rationality in which utility-maximizing agents make forecasts in each period based on standard econometric techniques such as least squares. In many cases this converges to a rational expectations equilibrium. All these refinements contrast with the drastic alternative offered by the very recent 'Animal Spirits' approach (Akerlof and Shiller (2009), DeGrauwe (2009) ). The latter paper is particularly apposite as it proposes a radical alternative to a standard New Keynesian model with rational expectations. Some agents are optimists and some are pessimists and use ad hoc simple rules to forecast future output. There are shifts from optimism to pessimism are driven by a form of adaptive expectations which drive endogenous cycles and inertia without inertial mechanisms such as habit and indexing. This framework provides an interesting challenge to the existing paradigm which needs to show that, with the refinements set out here, it can too explain the same stylized facts without recourse to these inertial mechanisms.
By treating DSGE models estimated by Bayesian-Maximum-Likelihood methods I have argued that they can be considered as probability models in the sense described by Sims (2007) and be used for risk-assessment and policy design. This is true for any one model, but with a range of models on offer it is possible also to design interest rate rules that are simple and robust across the rival models and across the distribution of parameter estimates for each of these rivals as in Levine et al. (2008) . After making models better in the sense described in the first part of this section, a possible road ahead is to consider rival models as being distinguished by the model of expectations. This would avoid becoming 'a prisoner of a single system' at least with respect to expectations formation where, as we have seen, there is relatively less consensus on the appropriate modelling strategy.
